All commercial ships over 500 GT which trade
internationally are subjected to Port State Control (PSC) inspections on a
regular basis. As shown in the above comparative graph, Tokyo MOU statistics show that ISM Code related deficiencies continue to be the
most frequent cause of PSC ship detentions with a collective total of 731 such
cases during 2015 – 2017. This Risk Bulletin will therefore focus on the ISM
Code segment of the IMO’s PSC Inspection Guidelines and the suggested steps
that MM members should take to avoid ISM Code non-compliance and PSC detention
of their vessels.
Background
The ISM Code
was created as an IMO priority response to dangerously unsafe management
practices both ashore and at sea. Its incorporation as Chapter IX of SOLAS
makes ISM Code compliance mandatory for all commercial vessels over 500 GT
trading internationally. Subject to the provisions of Non-Convention Vessel
national law, the ISM Code may also be mandatory on board all vessels (both
under and over 500 GT) engaged in domestic trades.
The IMO, as a UN agency, cannot directly enforce
compliance with any of the IMO Conventions or Codes. This must be left to Flag
States and their appointed Recognised Organisations (ROs). Many of them have
done a poor job. However, PSC – acting
under the authority granted by the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS) – also have this power and they
are intensifying its use on board foreign flag vessels that enter into their
Port State jurisdictions. It is therefore important for MM members to be fully
aware of the connection between PSC inspections and powers and shipowner
compliance with the ISM Code.
The IMO’s Resolution A.1119(30) PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL, 2017 and its 17 Appendices provide detailed Guidelines on the conduct of Port State Control (PSC) inspections. Their more than 110 pages cover every aspect of a ship’s regulatory compliance with the SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW conventions and their associated IMO Codes, Resolutions and Circulars. The application of these IMO Guidelines by PSC authorities is not mandatory but they are “invited” by the IMO to do so with the goal of harmonising all such inspections on a global basis.
The ISM Code inspection segment of the aforementioned PROCEDURES is contained within MSC-MEPC.4/Circ.4, GUIDELINES FOR PSC OFFICERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT (ISM) CODE. The key elements of their operation are explained below.
Inspection of the ship and its
Safety Management System (SMS)
Section 1.
GENERAL, provides a clear statement that:
1.3 Port State control officers (PSCOs) do not perform
safety management audits. PSCOs conduct inspections of ship, which are a
sampling process and give a snapshot of the vessel on a particular day.
If the
attending PSCO is not required to perform a safety audit, then just what is he/she
required to do in relation to inspecting the ISM Code Safety Management System
(SMS) on board?
The PSC
process is well established and will normally begin with an “initial
inspection” and “opening meeting” between the attending PSCO and the Master.
This process will start with a review all of the ship’s certificates inclusive
of the flag state ISM Code Document of Compliance (DOC) issued to the
shipowners and the Safety Management Certificate (SMC) issued to the ship. It
should be noted that a deficiency in either the DOC or SMC certificates in
terms of their content details or validity will likely result in the vessel
being detained until rectified.
The “initial
inspection” process will then normally progress to include a cursory inspection
tour of the vessel. If the PSCO observes no technical or operational-related
deficiencies during this tour, there will be no need for him/her to inspect the
implementation of the ISM Code as this will be deemed to be satisfactory. However, if there are observed deficiencies,
this will normally constitute “clear grounds” for conducting a “more detailed
inspection” of the vessel inclusive of ISM Code implementation. For example,
the observation of a hatch cover deficiency suggests that the ISM Code
requirement for the operation of a shipboard Planned Maintenance scheme and the
reporting of non-conformities may not be functioning.
Technical, operational and ISM Code related
deficiencies
Subsection
6.1.3 of the IMO’s PSC Guidelines provides that if there are anytechnical and/or operational-related
deficiencies found during this inspection they should be, “…individually or collectively considered by the PSCO, using their
professional judgement…”. The PSCO should then advise whether in terms
of associated ISM Code implementation:
There is no
failure or lack of effectiveness; or
There is a failure or lack of effectiveness; or
There is a serious
failure or lack of effectiveness.
Subsection
7.1.2 provides that if there are technical or operational-related deficiencies
reported which:
Do not show
a failure, or lack of effectiveness, of the implementation of the ISM Code,
then no ISM-related deficiency
should be noted in the PSC inspection report;
Individually or collectively do not warrant the
detention of the ship but indicate a failure, or lack of effectiveness of the
implementation of the ISM Code, then an ISM-related deficiency should be noted
in the PSC inspection report with a requirement for an internal safety audit
and corrective action within three months;
Individually or collectively lead to detention of the ship and indicate a serious failure, or lack of
effectiveness, of the implementation of the ISM Code – report an ISM-related
deficiency in the PSC inspection report with the requirement that a safety
management audit must be carried out by the Administration/ RO before the ship
may be released from her detention.
Risks and Solutions
In summary, it can be seen that PSC inspections are
not designed to accomplish an audit of a vessel’s SMS in relation to either
content or its on board implementation. The PSC starting point will therefore
be a simple review of the content and validity of a vessel’s DOC and SMC
certificates during the “initial inspection” phase. However, if the PSC
inspection progresses to a “more detailed inspection”, this also opens the door
to a PSC assessment of any associated failure or lack of effectiveness of the
ship’s SMS and ISM Code compliance and possible PSC detention.
How then to avoid such a situation? The obvious
solution is to ensure that your fleet is always well maintained in full
accordance with its ISM Code Planned Maintenance System and all regulatory
requirements. This is not always continuously feasible in an industry where
ship’s crews are now small and time in port is often short. One answer to this
problem is to ensure that all pre-arrival deficiencies observed by the Master,
officers and crew are entered to the SMS system as non-conformities and are
reported to shore management. This demonstrates ship and shore awareness and an
intention to rectify and close-out the deficiency from the system within a
defined period. Do nothing and your Master’s omission can become an admission
to PSC that your SMS is little more than unworkable pieces of paper.
The other important PSC inspection tactic is to ensure
that your Masters always take the “opening meeting” opportunity to advise the
attending PSCO of any pre-existing deficiencies in the vessel. This should of
course include the results of any previous PSC inspections and any required rectifications
which remain outstanding. All such “opening meeting” advice should be
accompanied by the provision of the ship’s current SMS non-conformities
reports. The desired outcome is to assure the attending PSCO that the SMS is
not a failure and does not lack effectiveness. Thus, although deficiencies may
exist, the vessel should be provided with the necessary PSCO permission to
complete the planned rectifications and not be detained.
Conclusion and Takeaway
The purpose of this Risk Bulletin and its links is to
highlight the important connectivity between the PSC inspection system and the
ISM Code. In short, if technical or operational deficiencies are observed by a
PSCO, then this will almost certainly lead to a PSC assessment of the
effectiveness of ISM Code implementation. If a negative assessment and PSC detention
then follows, this can result in revenue losses (inclusive of off-hire),
unplanned port costs to the owner’s account and a PSC ship detention post to
the Equasis website reporting system which is open to public view. Not a good
place to be.
It is essential that all of the parties engaged in the operation and maintenance of a vessel understand their roles in ensuring a positive outcome following a PSC inspection. It follows that the same parties must also appreciate that their fully engaged compliance with the obligations imposed by the ISM Code is a critical part of this process. MM would therefore encourage its members to share this Risk Bulletin with their ship managers, their Masters and crews as an integral part of minimising our members’ exposure to risks and optimising their market reputations and profitability.
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