Introduction
The latest ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) report advises a total of 62 piracy/armed robbery attacks on vessels transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) during 2024. This Risk Bulletin reminds Members of the need to avoid SOMS area transit security complacency by ensuring full ISPS Code compliance and attention to ReCAAP ship security bulletins and guidelines.
Background
Piracy/armed robbery attacks on shipping in the SOMS area have presented a substantial risk for decades. These attacks have included crew kidnapping, the hijacking (‘siphoning’) of oil tanker cargoes and even the snatching of smaller vessels. These problems became so intense that in 2005, the SOMS area was declared a ‘high-risk area’ by Lloyd’s Joint War Committee (JWC).
NOTE: The terms ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery’ are effectively the same in terms of the nature of the attack itself. However, they differ as to geographical location in that ‘piracy’ is deemed to be an armed attack for private gain outside of territorial waters (UNCLOS Convention 1982, Article 101), whereas a similar attack is deemed ‘armed robbery’ if it occurs within internal waters, territorial waters or archipelagic waters (IMO Res. A1025 (26) Code of Practice for Investigation of Piracy and Armed Robbery).
Fortunately, the aforesaid extreme events were quickly brought under control through the coordinated efforts of the police and naval forces of the bordering coastal states, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The result was the removal of the JWC ‘high-risk area’ designation and its associated increase in insurance premiums.
Regrettably, and as detailed in the latest ReCAAP annual report, less dangerous but still significant security risks for both ships and their crews continue to plague the SOMS area. The most recent being the 7 Jan 2025 attack on a bulk carrier. These matters are all discussed below.
ReCAAP Report Summary
The ReCAAP report provides detailed information on ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia’. The bullet point synopsis below highlights its ‘all Asia’ data with a focus on SOMS transits and related risks.
- The severity of attacks is Categorised by ReCAAP as follows:
CAT 1: Attackers armed with guns or knives. Crew likely to suffer assault and injury and ship and/or cargo stolen.
CAT 2: Attackers (usually 4-9) armed primarily with knives/machetes. Crew threatened and held hostage while ship ransacked for crew cash, ship stores and engine parts. Crew may suffer crew assault or injury.
CAT 3: Attackers (usually 3-4) armed with knives/machetes or sticks/bats. Crew not physically harmed but possibly threatened. Theft of ship stores and engine spares.
CAT 4: Attackers (usually 1-3) not armed, and no threats made against crew. Often flee empty-handed if sighted and alert sounded by ship’s crew. - An ‘all Asia’ total of 107 (inclusive of 11 attempted/failed) attacks occurred in 2024, representing a small (6%) increase in the total of 101 attacks recorded for 2023.
- An ‘all Asia’ increase in the number of armed attacks (i.e. CATs 1, 2 and 3), together with the size of attack groups.
- Continuation of SOMS as a ReCAAP “area of concern” with 58% (i.e. 62 of the total 107 ‘all Asia’ attacks) occurring in the SOMS area.
- Majority (86%) of SOMS attacks (53) classified as CAT 4 and “opportunistic” and “hit and run” in nature. However, the balance of 9 SOMS attacks were armed attacker and higher risk CAT 2 and CAT 3 incidents.
- Majority (89%) of SOMS attacks (55) occurred on board loaded and low freeboard bulk carriers and tankers with the balance on board loaded/low freeboard and slow moving tug and barge units.
- Majority (84%) of SOMS attacks (52) occurred during hours of darkness between 2300 and 0600 hrs.
- Prevalence of the theft of engine spares to the extent that ReCAAP are concerned as to the possible existence of an organised ‘black market’.
SOMS Area Piracy/Armed Robbery Risks
Reports on the frequency and seriousness of piracy/armed robbery attacks in the SOMS area are readily available on the ReCAAP website and recently updated mobile phone App. However, the details of such attacks in terms of their precise methodology and subsequent assessment of any associated targeted ship security failures are difficult to obtain. This is no doubt for privacy and security reasons.
Supplementary information is, therefore, often based on media and private security sources reporting on the circumstances of such incidents. The well-known and reliable Maritime Executive (ME) website provides two important SOMS piracy insights in a 30 Oct 2023 article.
In terms of severity, the ME article refers to a Singapore MPA-reported attack on an eastward-bound bulk carrier in the SOMS area and a related and severe injury to the master, which required his urgent disembarkation for treatment. The vessel was then searched by the Singapore Police Coast Guards, but nothing appeared to be stolen. No other information was released.
With reference to SOMS risk and geographical area, the ME article advises that:
“The three hotspots are at Pulau Karimun, near the eastern entrance of the Strait of Malacca; Pulau Cula, near Phillip Channel at the southernmost corner of the Straits’ traffic separation scheme; and Tanjung Tondong, near the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait. The robbers usually work at night, and strongly prefer to target slow-moving bulkers in the eastbound lane, which is closer to Indonesia.”
NOTE: Reference to the ReCAAP website and their incident frequency and location maps confirms the ME article’s assessment.
As to what is being stolen, tug and barge units loaded with scrap metal are prime targets for ‘hit and run’ attacks by fast boats and nimble ‘sea robbers’ who leap on board moving barges. They then snatch and throw down pieces of scrap into their waiting boats. Insanely dangerous to all but the tug crew. As such and considering the relatively low value of what is stolen, it seems likely that many such incidents go unreported.
Attacks on bulk carriers and tankers are a different story. The piracy/armed robbery attraction here is that when such ships are fully loaded, they have a low freeboard. This makes access up on to their main decks much easier. Their ship stores, engine parts and crew cash and possessions also make them potentially high reward targets.
The attacks on bulkers and tankers include several incidents of robbers boarding, finding their way down into an unlocked engine room, helping themselves to valuable spare parts and then escaping – much to the ship crew’s subsequent humiliation – without any detection. These scenarios provide disturbing examples of shipboard security complacency.
The associated and troubling issue is as to what could happen if armed robbers are sighted and challenged by the crew? Yes, on several occasions the attackers have reportedly dropped their loot and run for it. But such confrontations could quickly lead to crew injury (as noted above) or even death. Alternatively, the sabotage of engine equipment or controls to stop the ship and create an escape diversion. All dangerous occurrences which highlight the critical need to prevent the boarding by armed or unarmed robbers while underway in the SOMS area.
SOMS Area Piracy/Armed Robbery Loss Prevention
The starting point for loss prevention must, of course, be by reference to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)Code as applicable to vessels regulated by the SOLAS Convention. Vessels under 500 GT or vessels which are engaged solely in domestic trade will likely be regulated by similar NCVS regulation.
The ISPS Code requires that all regulated vessels are provided with a valid ISPS Code certificate together with a Ship Security Plan (SSP). The implementation of the Code is the responsibility of the Master and the certified Ship Security Officer (SSO).
The ISPS Code sets three security levels:
- Level One: Normal/ baseline
- Level Two: Heightened security
- Level Three: Exceptional security.
Singapore MPA’s ISPS Code security level for a SOMS transit is set at Level One. However, several flag states have set higher security levels for any of their vessels transiting the SOMS area. Examples include China which has set the SOMS area at security Level Three and Liberia at Level Two.
The SOMS area is not classified as a JWC ‘high-risk area’ but is a ReCAAP ‘area of concern’. MMIA, therefore, considers it advisable for Members to set not less than ISPS Code ‘Level Two – heightened security’ as the appropriate ISPS Code security level for shipboard implementation prior to entry of any of their vessels into the SOMS area.
Members are also referred to the ReCAAP website and webpages inclusive of weekly, quarterly and annual reports on piracy/armed robbery in Asia and the SOMS area. Guidelines on reporting incidents in the SOMS area and in Asian waters are also available for downloading, printing and posting on the bridge.
Of special importance is the ReCAAP ‘Regional Guide 2 to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia’. Published in 2022, as an update and consolidation of previous ReCAAP guidelines, it provides a comprehensive and well-illustrated 60 page advice to shipowners and mariners. Members should ensure that a copy is downloaded and available on board all their vessels that trade in Asian waters.
NOTE: The ReCAAP documents referred to are all designed to supplement the ISPS Code security obligations and enhance their implementation within the context of navigation in Asian waters, inclusive of the SOMS area. They have been prepared with the benefit of well over a decade of ReCAAP’s regional experience and should be considered as an essential counter-piracy/armed robbery tool.
Conclusion and Takeaway
The ReCAAP annual report for end 2024 shows that although the SOMS area security situation has greatly improved over the past years, the threat of piracy and armed robbery at CATs 2, 3 and 4 is far from over. As such, it appears neither safe nor prudent for the SOMS area to be considered as an ISPS Code ‘Level One – normal/baseline’ area for counter piracy/armed robbery purposes.
MMIA’s recommendation to Members is to actively discourage SOMS area security complacency by requiring that all their ships transiting this area implement not less than ISPS Code ‘Level Two – heightened risk’ security measures in conjunction with ReCAAP reports and guidelines.
NOTE: The IMO’s FAQ on Maritime Security webpage advises the difference between Level One and Level Two security. The IMO’s interpretation is as follows:
- Level One means the level at which minimum protective measures shall be maintained at all times.
- Level Two means the level at which appropriate additional measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.
As an example, a vessel on passage in an area where no piracy or armed robbery attacks have been reported would normally operate at Level One with the bridge watch during night hours consisting of the Officer of the Watch (OOW) and a designated lookout. If the same vessel entered the SOMS area – where ReCAAP CAT 2, 3 and 4 attacks are reported to be common – it would be appropriate for the master and SSO to implement Level Two security by alerting the crew, increasing the bridge team lookouts, and ‘hardening up’ security by setting up a radio equipped deck night patrols and locking all accesses to storerooms, accommodation and the engine room during hours of darkness.
Members are encouraged to engage with their ship managers, shipboard SSOs and masters to review their ISPS Code or NCVS equivalent SSPs to ensure that they are up to date and, for ships trading in Asian waters, incorporate the latest ReCAAP advice and recommendations. Additionally, that the ISPS Code obligation which requires that a formal security risk assessment – inclusive of security level setting is conducted before every voyage and is incorporated into the navigational voyage plan.
